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1. A Macroeconomic and Banking Collapse 
 
In the five quarters from 2008 Q1 to 2009 Q2, Ireland’s real GNP, seasonally 
adjusted, has fallen by 13.5%. The unemployment rate has risen by eight points, 
labour force participation has fallen and emigration has resumed. The economic 
decline in Ireland exceeds by a large margin those being experienced by most other 
European countries, and constitutes the worst recession in Ireland since the early 
years of the Second World War. The policy challenge involves much more than fiscal 
consolidation, or recovery from a routine cyclical downturn.   In an address to the 
recent ESRI/Foundation for Fiscal Studies conference, the Central Bank governor 
argued that Irish macro policy needs to focus, not just on the correction of the fiscal 
deficit, but on a broader re-balancing of the macro economy, acknowledging the 
nature and extent of the economic downturn from which recovery must somehow be 
managed (Honohan (2009b)).  
 
Ireland has had two bubbles, not just one. There has been both a credit-fuelled 
property bubble and an associated bubble in public expenditure, resulting in an 
unprecedented macroeconomic contraction and the rapid collapse into severe fiscal 
deficit. Both bubbles attracted criticism along the way. The risk of a bubble in 
housing was widely discussed from 2000 onwards. On the spending boom, see 
Lawlor and McCarthy (2003). The GGB deficit has worsened from approximate 
balance to the unsustainable level of 12% of GDP in just two years. It will stay at this 
level in 2010 even if the Government succeeds in its intended adjustment of €4 billion 
in the December budget. Most of the deficit appears to be structural, and will not 
diminish automatically with macroeconomic recovery. Hence permanent measures 
need to be implemented to address the structural problem.  
 
The extent of the banking collapse has yet to be fully acknowledged in much public 
discussion. Bank of Ireland at the end of November 2009 had a market capitalisation 
of about €1.5 billion, comparable to a medium-sized industrial company. The 
capitalisation of Allied Irish Bank has recently been below the market value of its 
shareholdings in listed overseas associates in the USA and Poland, implying that the 
market places zero value on its Irish operations. The markets have placed no faith in 
the book value of bank capital for almost two years now, despite repeated 
reassurances from bankers, regulators and government consultants, and the markets 
have been proved right every time. The Irish banking system enjoys roughly €100 
billion in emergency liquidity support from the European Central Bank, equating to 
about 75% of national income. In relative terms, Ireland has had the largest banking 
collapse of any Eurozone member, and any pretence that the problem is merely one of 
liquidity, as distinct from solvency, has long since been abandoned by all independent 
observers. 
 
In the real economy, job losses in sectors other than government, health and education 
had reached 216,000 by Q2 2009 compared to the peak in Q1 2008, that is to say in 
just five quarters, with the trend still strongly downwards. With no possibility to 
devalue, the restoration of competitiveness requires a continuing reduction in prices 
and costs in Ireland relative to other Eurozone countries, the more so given Ireland’s 
exceptional exposure to the appreciating exchange rate. Since 1999, the harmonised   3
competitiveness index has worsened, on a producer price basis, by 16%, with the 
adverse effects concentrated on sectors exposed to sterling and the dollar, including 
many of the more labour-intensive trading businesses.   
 
2. Fiscal Consolidation – Enhancing Government Revenue 
 
The budget due on December 9
th will contain the fifth set of budgetary actions since 
July 2008, and it is salutary to note that the combined effect of these actions will have 
achieved no more than a containment of the GGB deficit to 12% of GDP next year. 
Tax revenue will reach about €32 billion this year, roughly 24% of GNP, according to 
the Pre-Budget Outlook (Department of Finance (2009b)).
1 Gross current revenue 
(including payroll taxes and some other items) will be about 30% of GNP, down from 
a peak of 40% in 1988 and 35% in 2006 and 2007. Revenue from stamp duties, 
capital gains taxes and corporation tax will likely be weak for several years to come – 
most financial companies, including IFSC companies, will have carry-forward tax 
losses for the foreseeable future, there will likely be modest realised capital gains, and 
some companies may be able to reclaim tax already paid. On the other hand there 
should be recovery in some tax heads in due course as private sector balance sheets 
are re-built, purchase taxes on cars being an example.  
 
The balance between tax increases and expenditure reductions, as well as their 
composition and the desirable time-scale for fiscal consolidation, have dominated 
discussions of budgetary policy options. On time-scale, there is no evidence 
internationally nor from Ireland’s experience in the 1980s which points to a drawn-
out adjustment (Lane (2009)). If a deficit of 12% of GDP, and prospectively of 14 to 
15% of GNP, is to be closed, it should be clear that the likely solution is a reduction 
in the public spending share of GNP and an increase in the government revenue share. 
Note that permanent tax and spending actions are required to address a structural 
deficit.   
 
Increasing government revenue relative to GNP can be achieved in a variety of ways, 
and not just by increasing rates of tax. There are in any event severe constraints on the 
freedom of manoeuvre of government in tax policy, defined by the tax policies of 
neighbouring, and even of more distant, jurisdictions. Most indirect taxes do not 
display sizeable ‘headroom’ against the UK rates, and direct taxes on earned income 
have already been increased significantly. There are two discretionary actions which 
might be considered in order to enhance the revenue share, without further increases 
in rates of tax. 
 
Tax Credits and Allowances. 
 
The current Irish tax code keeps substantial numbers of lower-income workers out of 
liability for income tax. Some view this as a problem, although it can just as readily 
be seen as an achievement. The price level, as measured by the CPI, has fallen 6.6% 
since the budget of October 2008, and the HICP, which I prefer, by just under 3%. 
These decreases have been cited by the recent spending review (Department of 
Finance (2009a)), and by the Minister for Finance, as justification for reductions in 
pay and in various categories of public spending. But on the tax side, they constitute a 
                                                 
1 I prefer GNP to GDP as a denominator for fiscal ratios, see appendix.   4
compelling case for a reduction in tax credits and allowances. The Exchequer is now 
suffering from negative fiscal drag, and those below the income tax threshold in late 
2009 include people whose real income has risen over the past year. The rising price 
level was regularly invoked over the last decade as support for increases in tax credits 
and allowances, and the there is no logical case for ignoring the fall in prices as it 
affects real tax burdens when it is relied upon to support expenditure reductions.   
 
Disposing of Intangible State Assets 
 
The State from time to time disposes of intangible State assets, such as 
  
(i)  rights to the radio-magnetic spectrum, used by mobile phone companies, 
radio stations, TV stations, commercial and State organizations with 
wireless communications systems; 
 
(ii)  permits to emit carbon dioxide, used by large industrial companies and 
electric power generators; 
 
(iii)  mineral and hydrocarbon exploration licenses; 
 
(iv)  fishing quotas and some extra-EU import quotas 
 
It has been the practice in Ireland to allocate these scarce commercial assets for a 
fixed time-period after which a new allocation is made. They are distributed either for 
free, or at a nominal or low price unrelated to their commercial value. Allocation is by 
administrative procedure, usually a formal beauty contest. These beauty contests are 
fiercely contested, since the assets are being offered below market value. 
 
There has been controversy about these allocations, including allegations of 
corruption. The alternative is to allocate by auction, where the highest bidder wins. 
This has three advantages. The State maximizes its revenue. The highest bidder wins, 
meaning that economic efficiency is enhanced – the asset ends up in its highest-value 
use. Finally the process is transparent, and scope for corruption, or for allegations of 
corruption, eliminated. Allegations of corruption are more likely from disappointed 
beauty contestants than from under-bidders, McCarthy (2003).  
 
Most European countries, and the USA, allocate by auction. The most significant 
items include emission permits, where Ireland has allocated for free but the UK has 
announced that the next allocation will include an auction component and the Irish 
government should follow suit at the earliest feasible date. Ireland disposed of mobile 
phone licenses at well below value, and virtually all were subsequently re-sold at 
higher prices. Radio licenses have also been re-sold at substantial profit in some 
cases. The Department of Finance should prepare a policy paper on the issue, which 
should list all of the intangible asset disposals which arise, discuss the methods 
currently used, and consider the auction alternative. Note that the resultant revenues 
would be recurring and not once-off. Finally, should the auction route be chosen in 
order to maximize revenue, care needs to be taken in auction design: there is now 
extensive international experience with auctions, and some designs work better than 




3. Fiscal consolidation – Reducing Government Spending 
 
In addition to the measures contained in the report of An Bord Snip, government is 
considering two expenditure policy matters which were outside its remit. The first 
concerns rates of pay in the public service and the second the capital spending 
programme. 
 
Public Service Pensions and the NPRF 
 
The pay bill includes pensions, and there is a substantial medium-term problem 
highlighted in the recent report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General (2009). 
Unfunded accrued liabilities stood at €108 billion at end 2008, and the annual cash 
cost is expected to approximately quadruple as a % of GNP over the next fifty years. 
Most Irish public service pensions are final salary, unfunded pay-as-you-go schemes. 
It is time to consider whether the State should now close its final salary pension 
schemes and move to a defined-contribution, pre-funded, model, as is happening 
throughout the private sector. As well as helping to regularise the public finances, this 
move would improve mobility between the public and private sectors and re-integrate 
the national labour market. It would also prevent the emergence of a two-tier system 
of retirement income provision, to go with our two-tier health service.   
 
The C and AG’s report mentions assets in the National Pension Reserve Fund as a 
kind of offset to the pension liabilities. The NPRF is a long-short hedge fund, short 
bonds and long equities, and not a sovereign wealth fund comparable to those 
operated by Norway and several oil-rich states in the Arabian Gulf. Every €1 in the 
Fund has a counterpart in the Exchequer debt. The government does not plan to 
borrow any further money to invest in equities, and the Fund should now be wound 
down: the carrying cost of the Fund has risen substantially in the last two years in line 
with the premium on Irish government debt, and to persist with it adds gratuitously to 
the volatility of the government’s net financial position.  
 
The Capital Programme    
 
Some projects in the National Development Plan are backlog-elimination, some are 
capacity-enhancing, while some are Bubble left-overs which lacked any compelling 
economic justification, even when Exchequer resources appeared to be unconstrained.  
The backlog-elimination projects should be left in place if they can be financed.  
The capacity enhancing projects should be deferred, given the extent of the collapse 
in economic activity. The Bubble left-overs should never have been there in the first 
place, and the crisis presents the opportunity to delete them from the programme. 
 
It is instructive to put some numbers on the economic slowdown and its implications 
for capacity-enhancing projects. Given the severity and likely duration of the 
downturn, it is critical to allow for a major phase shift in the path of real GDP, and 
hence in the path of capacity requirements. At the time the NDP was prepared, 
longer-term forecasts were for GDP to grow 4 to 4.5%. Assume it was 4.25%. In   6
2008, real GDP fell 3% and a further fall of 7% appears likely for 2009. Recent 
forecasts suggest a path along these lines: 2010, -1%, 2011, + 3%, with +4% in both 
2012 and 2013.  
In the table below, the NDP assumption is compared with what now seems likely. 
 
                    
              Table 1: GDP Volumes Assumed in NDP, versus Current Forecast  
 
                                          Assumed NDP              Actual/Current Forecast 
 
                                     Volume        % Chg             Volume        % Chg    
 
          2007                    100.00            …                100.00             … 
 
          2008                    104.25          4.25                 97.00           -3.00 
 
          2009                    108.68          4.25                 90.21           -7.00 
 
          2010                    113.30          4.25                 89.31           -1.00 
 
          2011                    118.11          4.25                 91.99          +3.00 
 
          2012                    123.13          4.25                 95.67          +4.00  
 
          2013                    128.36          4.25                 99.49          +4.00  
                       
 
 
The loss in output equals a phase-shift of about seven years. Real GDP in 2013 will 
be only about 78% of the ‘NDP’ value, and there will have been zero growth from 
2007. Had the NDP planners known this, the NDP would have deferred the capacity-
enhancing projects at least to 2011 or 2012. There would hardly be any expenditure 
on them at the moment. I suspect this prospective phase shift is bigger than people 
have allowed for, as the recent controversy over paying for the new terminal at 
Dublin Airport has illustrated. The reduction in tender prices, up to 30% on some 
reports, reinforces the point. Of course, some capacity requirements relate to metrics 
other than GDP, such as population in certain age groups. Population may already be 
falling (emigration seems to be running at an annual rate of 30,000 or so in recent 
quarters, and could even be offsetting the natural increase). Projections need to be re-
worked in these areas also. 
 
There has been a tendency to over-protect the capital programme in recent public 
discussion, in a context where it is clear that project appraisal had become politicised.  
If project appraisal has been a failure there is no point to an intensification of 
whatever procedures have failed. The practice of entrusting project appraisals to 
consultants selected, and paid for, by the project champions (government 
departments, state agencies, quangoes, even lobby groups with access to Exchequer 
subvention) has hopefully been discredited, along with the potentially useful 
technique of cost-benefit analysis. Cost benefit in Ireland appears at times to have   7
become a branch of the public relations industry. It is time to set up a unit in the 
Department of Finance to undertake, either directly or through consultants chosen by 
Finance, appraisals of all projects over a specified value. Projects need champions, 
but they should be entitled only to make submissions to the evaluation process. 
Appraisals would be public documents, and should be laid before the Dail.  
 
4. Re-Balancing the Macro-Economy 
 
If we assume that real GDP will have re-attained the 2007 level by 2013, and that the 
fiscal deficit will be back under control, it does not follow that the rest of the 
economy will look at all like it did in the final Bubble year. Indeed it cannot, unless 
someone can be found to finance another Bubble. In 2007, the Irish economy had a 
construction sector which had become far too large, a bursting credit bubble, serious 
competitiveness problems and an emerging fiscal crisis. This was not a good place to 
be, and there should be no nostalgia for 2007. Fiscal ratios with the revenue/GNP 
figure higher, and the ratio of non-interest spending to GNP substantially lower, are 
both likely and desirable, but the rest of the economy needs to be re-engineered.  
 
 
              
                    Table 2: Sectoral Employment Trends (seasonally adjusted). 
 
                Tot Emp  Construction   ‘Public’ Emp   ‘Private’ Emp   Public as % Private 
 
Q1 04        1838.3          190.2                380.3               1458.0                     26.1 
          
Q1 05        1927.8          225.1                399.6               1528.2                     26.1 
 
Q1 06        2021.2          247.1                430.8               1590.4                     27.1 
 
Q1 07        2102.0          269.2                452.6               1649.4                     27.4 
Q2 07        2119.6          272.8                452.7               1666.9                     27.2 
Q3 07        2131.3          265.4                462.3               1669.0                     27.7 
Q4 07        2136.4          261.2                461.4               1675.0                     27.5 
 
Q1 08        2139.5          254.1                462.9               1676.6                     27.6 
Q2 08        2119.1          244.7                468.7               1650.4                     28.4 
Q3 08        2088.8          230.0                471.1               1617.7                     29.1 
Q4 08        2050.4          213.4                484.2               1566.2                     30.9 
 
Q1 09        1981.2          181.5                479.7               1501.5                     31.9 
Q2 09        1944.9          158.0                484.8               1460.1                     33.2 
 
Chg % v 
   Peak           -9.1          -42.1                    0.0                  -12.9                       0.0 
 
Source: Table 3, QNHS for Q2 2009, www.cso.ie. 
   8
Public: NACE O (Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security), 




Recent developments in sectoral employment totals are instructive in this regard. The 
three sectors Public Administration, Education and Health exceed in aggregate the 
known totals for public employment, but contain most of it, plus some people 
nominally in the private sector but employed with the aid of public financial support. 
All three sectors produce largely non-tradable services. Employment in these sectors 
was still rising to Q2 2009, and had reached one-third of employment in the private 
economy, versus a little over one-quarter a few years back. Since macroeconomic 
adjustment requires an improvement in the external position, through an internal 
devaluation, this must result in a shift of resources into tradable sectors, including 
labour resources. In practise this means a shift into private sectors other than 
construction, where it is likely that employment will continue to fall for some time. 
Pay reductions in these three sectors should be seen as part of the adjustment process. 
A successful internal devaluation needs to extend beyond pay reductions, to include 
utility charges, local authority charges and professional fees. Property costs need to 
adjust downwards too, reflecting the enormous excess supply of residential and 
commercial property. 
 
In this connection, it is wrong to argue that the public service pension levy was 
identical to a pay cut in macroeconomic terms. It feels that way of course for those on 
the receiving end, but, unlike a pay cut, it did not extend to those already retired, and 





























5. Re-Building the Banking System 
 
The Irish banks got into trouble for three reasons. Balance sheet expansion was too 
rapid, and financed to an excessive degree by inter-bank and other foreign borrowing; 
the loan portfolio became concentrated into the property and construction sectors, and 
into residential mortgages; and the lending went bad, exposing rapidly the weakness 
in capital structure and liability management (Honohan (2009a)). For example, the net 
foreign liability of the Irish banks grew from 10% of GDP in 2003 to 60% in 2008 as 
they continued to lend into what had been repeatedly identified by independent 
commentators as a speculative property bubble. The subsequent collapse was 
precipitated by the failure of US bank Lehman Brothers, which some in the Irish 
banking industry continue to perceive as a causative factor. The Irish banks were so 
over-lent into the bubble that their net worth was likely to evaporate as soon as the 
bubble burst, as it was always bound to do. The failure of the regulatory and 
supervisory authorities in Ireland to see what was coming, and the failure of bank 
boards and management to exercise greater prudence, have yet to be subjected to 
public investigation. 
 
The Government chose, in September 2008, to guarantee bank deposits, senior debt 
and even some categories of explicitly subordinated debt, a guarantee which runs out 
in September 2010. The legislation establishing an asset management agency, 
NAMA, is now on the statute book, and will see the liquidity problems of the banks 
ameliorated through the purchase by the state of impaired loan assets. Liquidity 
problems could however persist post-NAMA, particularly if the wind-down of 
liquidity provision by the European Central Bank proceeds quickly. But most industry 
observers believe that solvency issues remain, acute in some cases, and that the Irish 
banks need to be re-capitalised to substantial degree.     
 
Of the two most seriously damaged banks, Irish Nationwide (remarkably, a building 
society with only a small portion of residential mortgages in its portfolio) and Anglo 
Irish, acquired systemic importance only through expansion to a scale which 
threatened the system as a whole and both could be wound down. The rest, including 
Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish, will end up with much smaller balance sheets and 
new shareholders. 
 
Either of these large banks could end up too big to save, from the standpoint of an 
over-extended Irish Exchequer, should they get into further trouble in future years, 
and there is an urgent requirement for a Bank Resolution Act to deal with future 
problems in the sector. Such an Act, had it been available, would have helped to 
minimise taxpayer exposure to the costs of the bank rescue in September 2008, 
although it is fair to acknowledge that Ireland was not alone in lacking suitable 
statutory powers to seize and re-structure failing banks. The UK legislation passed 
earlier this year could serve as a model (Brierley (2009)).   
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Starting from here, we need to address deficiencies in bank capital quickly, re-visit 
the position of bond-holders in the Irish banks when the guarantee comes to be 
renewed, as realistically it must; and enact a bank resolution regime. Public 
acceptance of the need for austerity would benefit from a comprehensive public 
inquiry, perhaps through the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance or the Public 




Appendix: Choice of Denominator for Fiscal Ratios 
 
It is conventional internationally to express fiscal ratios (tax or total government 
revenue, current or total expenditure, various debt and deficit measures) as a 
percentage of GDP, a geographical output concept. GDP answers the question ‘how 
much output is produced annually in China’? The EU’s Stability and Growth Pact 
explicitly employs GDP as the denominator for debt and deficit ratios, and 
organisations such as the IMF and OECD routinely make international comparisons, 
and do fiscal policy analysis, with GDP as the denominator.  
 
The alternatives are GNP, GNI (gross national income), or GNDI (gross national 
disposable income). They are related as follows: 
 
GDP plus/minus factor payments abroad = GNP 
 
GNP plus/minus other current payments abroad (eg EU taxes/subsidies) = GNI;  
 
GNI plus/minus other international transfers (foreign aid, emigrants’ remittances, net 
EU transfers) = GNDI. 
 
There are many countries where the differences between these aggregates are minor. 
A country with a small net creditor/debtor position, small foreign sector, will have 
GDP roughly = GNP roughly = GNI, and if it is not a big aid giver or receiver, and 
has small migrants’ remittances, GNDI will be similar too. 
 
Ireland is not such a country. Factor payments abroad are substantial and both 
emigrants’ remittances and outward aid flows have been rising recently. So income is 
less than output and the choice of denominator matters. 
 
Some figures for the ratio of GNI to GDP for European countries are shown in the 
table. The Euro-area average is 99.3%. Most countries are in a range of a few points 
either side of 100, with just four out of twenty below 96. Just two, Luxembourg and 
Ireland, are below 90. In both cases, there are substantial annual net outflows in the 
form of factor payments, mainly returns on foreign capital. At least for comparative 















    Table 3: Ratios of Gross National Income to Gross Domestic Product, 2008. 
 
   Austria            98.4            Hungary             93.3           Slovenia                      97.7 
 
   Belgium        100.4            Ireland              85.8            Spain                          97.3 
 
   Czech Rep      92.5             Italy                   98.5            Sweden                    102.2 
 
   Denmark       101.8            Luxembourg      75.5            United Kingdom      102.1 
 
   Finland           99.8             Netherlands       97.4 
   
   France          100.7             Poland (2007)    96.4            Euro Area                  99.3 
 
   Germany      101.7             Portugal             96.0 
 




It also matters when looking at long time-series, since the relationship between the 
competing denominators has been shifting. Up to the mid-1970s, GNP and GDP were 
roughly equal, for example, and GNP was about 90% of GDP through the late 1980s 
and up to the mid-1990s. It has recently fluctuated about 85%. Recent trends in the 
income measures, as a % of GDP, are shown in the next table. 
 
 
                
                   Table 4: Alternative Income Measures as % of GDP, Ireland.  
 
                  1995 ¦   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2008 
 
GNP           88.4     85.2    83.8     81.8    84.5    84.7    84.6   86.3    85.0    85.0 
 
GNI            90.2     86.2    84.5     83.0    85.5    85.6    85.8   87.0    85.6    85.8  
 
GNDI         91.1     86.1    83.9     82.4    84.8    84.9    84.8   86.0    84.5    84.4 
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All three ratios fell sharply from 1995 to 2000, oscillated to 2006 and have slipped 
again in the last couple of years.  
 
In the context of assessing fiscal policy, and in particular of the credibility of fiscal 
consolidation programmes, the critical issue is taxable capacity. The best denominator 
for fiscal ratios, in this view, is the one closest to the tax base. Interestingly, member 
states pay contributions to the EU budget based on GNI, although the EU uses the 
output measure GDP for fiscal ratios under the Stability and Growth Pact. This when 
it comes to levying the Eu’s ‘tax’ on members, GDP is abandoned.  In supporting a 
contention that Irish public spending has been low compared to European averages, 
Karl Whelan (2009) favours GDP as the fiscal denominator. Noting that not everyone 
agrees, he states (in footnote 8): 
 
‘Another argument is that GNP rather than GDP should be used for such 
comparisons. I disagree with these arguments because all income produced in Ireland 
is eligible for taxation by the Irish government.’  
 
Output produced in Ireland does not translate into income available to Irish taxable 
entities though. A portion of GDP (corporate profits much of which are ultimately 
expatriated) are nominally subject to tax at 12.5% (it is not clear that all are actually 
taxed at this rate), but most tax revenue comes from income, payroll and expenditure 
taxes. These are probably best proxied by GNDI. If a choice has to be made between 
GNP and GDP, GNP is far closer to GNDI. Whelan’s point that   ‘….all income 
produced in Ireland is eligible for taxation by the Irish government’ is true but not 
operationally significant: the excess of GDP over GNP is taxed only a little, and it is 
not clear that an increase in the rate of tax (on currently expatriated corporate profits) 
would yield extra revenue. Of course, the best way to do taxable-capacity analysis is 
through a fully articulated model of tax revenues, and the ESRI model embeds a 
detailed revenue specification. Fiscal ratios are shorthand at best.    
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